World Trade Organization Actions In April 2004 the WTO ruled that U.S. 3 billion U.S. in cotton subsidies violate trade agreements and that almost 50 of EU sugar exports are illegal. In 1997-2003, U.S. cotton exports are subsidized by an average of 48 . The World Trade Organization (WTO) has extracted commitments from the Government of the Philippines, which is lower import barriers to half their current levels for a period of six years, and allows dramatically on increasing competition from heavily subsidized industrial countries and agricultural systems in North America and Europe. A recent Oxfam report estimates that the average household incomes of corn farmers will be reduced by up to 30 over the six years of cheap imports from the U.S. lower prices in local markets. The report estimates that in the absence of trade restrictions, subsidized U.S. corncould be marketed at less than half the price of maize grown in the Philippine island of Mindanao, and livelihoods of up to half a million Filipino corn farmers (out of 1.2 million) are under immediate threat. An economist writes: “Many programs are administered without regard to its distributional impact too. You should not guess from surprising then that these programs show ing undesirable distributional consequences. sor Certainly we should not take us, but for other reasons. It is arrogant to believe that neglect of the analyst in distributive issues is something I normal, compared with the behavior of other players in the game of politics. Moreover, the reason that are so undesirable distributional consequences is political precisely because someone pays full attention to the distributional impact.Policies with undesirable consequences for not approving igno rance, but by a combination of knowledge and apathy: the co nition of the few who know they can benefit their substantially to such distribution, and then strongly pushing for “their “program, and the apathy of many pa gan for him and for whom the cost is so small that individually worth doing more to oppose the pro gram. In fact, the losers can even support the pro gram in exchange for winning support from another program (with a different set of undesirable distributional consequences sealing lines) which in turn benefits them. The political attention to the distributional impact does not reflect a concern for equity, but quite the opposite. The in political Therese of the distribution is strictly local, while the analyst is merely theoretical.The political interest is, however, a response to the realities of the interplay of political forces, conflicts between groups and the struggle for government largesse. No wonder enton ces to achieve political interests become dominant in the decision-making pro cess and that the distributional consequences are so opposed to the plan said. INPUTS, OUTPUTS AND BENEFITS A basic premise of policy analysis is that the result sults of public policy are the best basis for evalu ating accomplishments. The apprentice must always analyst pen tooth not mistakenly use the inputs as a measure of program benefits. The benefits can be assessed properly only from how much is obtained from a program and not how much is invested in it.To evaluate, for example, programs for the U.S. Navy, an analyst does not consider or ponder the number of sailors, ships, and missiles avio tions, but evaluates the ability of the Navy for a var lle out various missions such as rescue, amphibious assault beaches, air strikes and submarine detection and destruction in a variety of scenarios. In contrast, politicians often find that for their purposes, inputs provide the appropriate measure of program benefits. For the analyst, for example, be efits of military programs are the results ( ing the national security), but the central issue for a politician is knowing how much profit and jobs to their voters cast (do not forget distribution) different types and levels of military expenditure.The politician may feel compelled to defend the sys ma war of choice in terms of national defense (re sults), but their assessment is often based on dollars and jobs (inputs). This difference in perspective helps explain the political resistance to the program budget. For the analyst, a program budget is very helpful in making decisions in public spending because the costs associated explicitly with the results of the program.